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Is ‘formulation’ the essential ingredient of our practice as clinical psychologists?  If you 
are a trainee, or involved in supervising or training clinical psychologists you could be 
forgiven for coming to that conclusion.   
 
In the DCP’s Core Purpose and Philosophy of the Profession document (Division of 
Clinical Psychology, 2001), formulation is seen as one of the four core skills of a clinical 
psychologist.  The ability to come to a clear formulation of a client’s difficulties, their 
history and maintaining factors and from there to develop a treatment plan as part of an 
assessment process appears to be at the forefront of clinical psychology training. Yet 
despite the fact that formulation is now considered central to the professional practice of 
clinical psychology (e.g. Kinderman, 2001), neither of us remembers it being mentioned 
in any detail during our training as clinical psychologists in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  Although Clare Crellin (1998) has noted that the term began to appear in clinical 
psychology texts in the UK from the 1950s it does not seem to have come to be seen as 
central until recently. 
 
We do not think we are alone in feeling that formulation had a minimal influence on our 
development as clinical psychologists and it is perhaps testament to our profession’s 
ability to regularly reconstruct its identity that formulation, barely heard of a decade ago, 
is now seen as a central defining characteristic.  Indeed, Crellin (1998) has argued that 
the increasing importance of the concept has been influenced by what she sees as the 
desire of the profession of clinical psychology to define a unique and separate body of 
knowledge and skills and this, no doubt, serves a function of promoting clinical 
psychology as a unique discipline.  This history has led to a curious situation.  For 
example we have been struck by how much anxiety surrounds discussions of 
formulation.  Trainees talk of anxiety in struggling to come to a formulation and in how to 
best represent something that is always under construction in the somewhat linear 
formats required in case reports.  Similarly, supervisors talk of anxiety in helping trainees 
come to formulations since a) many were never taught about it (at least if they trained 
more than a decade ago) and b) they may not be required to produce a formulation in 
their everyday work.  Of course, Mollon (1989) reminds us that the anxiety of being 
‘found out’ as a fraud is endemic in clinical psychology. 
 
We have been moved to write about this since both of us have seen formulation rise in 
importance with some ambivalence.  These issues appear to come most to the fore in 
the context of training and it is our experience as both a supervisor and assessor of case 
reports which has prompted us to write this article.  It is trainees who experience most 
keenly the difference between the rhetoric of our profession and their lived experience of 
reality (Bostock, 1990; Spellman & Harper, 1996).  In this article we would like to pose 
some questions about formulation.  We do not think there are any easy answers to the 
questions we raise and we are certainly not the first to note dilemmas in the turn towards 
formulation (Boyle, 2001; Crellin, 1998; Johnstone, 2002).  Ways of addressing these 
concerns will, no doubt, largely reflect readers’ theoretical persuasions.  Our own debt to  
ideas from what have come to be termed social constructionist and critical psychology 
traditions will become evident in what we think might be possible ways forward. 
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Some questions about formulation 
 
1. When can a full formulation of a client’s difficulties occur? Is it only at the end of 
therapeutic work (Crellin, 1998)? 
 
2.  Is there only one correct formulation of a situation? If so, how do we know when we 
have found it? 
 
3. What are formulations for?  In other words, what do they enable us and our clients to 
do that we were unable to do before the concept was in common use? 
 
4. Who are formulations for?  Us as practitioners, our clients or others?  Do clients 
come to us asking for formulations? 
 
5. Why is it that most formulations are generally individualistic when we know that 
psychological difficulties arise in a social context (Boyle, 2001; Johnstone, 2002)? 
 
6. What is a formulation, a formulation of (Boyle, 2001)?  Do formulations only have to 
be about problems?  How might this fit with theoretical traditions which are not based 
on theories of pathology? 
 
7. Do formulations only have to be causal and historical?  How might this fit with 
traditions which are not based on causal theories of problems?  
 
8. Is a formulation true over time or is it only true of and at a particular time? 
 
9. By what criteria do we judge the quality of formulations?  By their ‘truth’ or by more 
pragmatic considerations like the notion of ‘fit’?  If the latter, then fit for whom and 
what (Bob, 1999)?   
 
10. Does our everyday clinical practice reflect straightforward categories like 
‘assessment’, ‘formulation’, ‘intervention’ and ‘evaluation’?  If not, why then is it that 
we require this of trainee case reports? 
 
 
The meaning(s) of ‘formulation’ 
 
One difficulty, noted by Lucy Johnstone (2002), is that although lots of people use the 
term ‘formulation’, they seem to mean different things by it.  Moreover, we suspect that 
whilst people might claim fidelity to a particular definition of formulation, actual 
formulations might be different in practice.  As some have asked of those appearing 
implicitly, if not explicitly, to claim that there can be a ‘correct’ formulation: would an 
inter-rater reliability of formulations be as poor as the low reliabilities of psychiatric 
diagnoses of which our profession has been rightly critical over the years?  The different 
meanings of formulation can lead to confusion (and, in a training context, failure, low 
marks or contradictory feedback) especially when there is an implicit assumption that 
there is only one true formulation of a person’s difficulties.  One could argue that the very 
flexibility of the term serves a useful function for the profession in serving to unite 
differing factions and potentially contradictory schools of thought in clinical psychology.   
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Of course clinical psychology cannot claim ownership of the term ‘formulation’ and it may 
be that we could learn something from its more general definition.  The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary defines ‘formula’ in two ways:  firstly as a definition or enunciation of principle 
in a particular form of words.  This sense includes a ‘principle serving to reconcile 
difference of aim or opinion (diplomats seeking a formula)’ (1986, p.386); and, secondly, 
in its mathematic and chemical senses (hence ‘formaulae’), ‘formulate’ is defined as to 
‘reduce to or express in a formula, set forth systematically’ (p.386).  In the difference in 
meaning between the former and the latter we can perhaps again see reflected the 
differences between the public and private faces of practice in clinical psychology.  
 
The notion of scientific description resonates with aspects of clinical psychology’s 
history: disinterested observation, a world of objectivity and neutrality with objects that 
conform to laws of behaviour. Such a style of science is a strong part of the heritage of 
psychology and keeps us closer by association with domains like mathematics, physics 
and chemistry.  Yet simplistic and naïve versions of scientific realism have experienced 
a crisis of legitimacy in recent years.  These days we do not see much evidence of 
committed naïve realism.  Rather there seems a fuzzier softer version expressed in a 
kind of:  ‘well of course one cannot be absolutely objective and disinterested in 
assessments, formulations and so on but still one can be relatively objective and that’s 
good enough’ way.  
 
This kind of ‘objectivity lite’ approach is understandable in the face of a broader culture 
that legitimates only certain kinds of knowledge for example in the rhetoric of ‘evidence-
based practice’ (Harper et. al., in press; Neiboer, et. al., 2000; Priebe & Slade, 2002). 
However at the same time it can serve to obscure under its coat tails arguably important 
epistemological and ethical dilemmas highlighted in a number of the questions we noted 
above.  
 
In comparison, the notion of formulation in the second sense seems to hold open a quite 
different kind of ‘chemistry’.  The developments of peace formulas, for example in 
Northern Ireland, are explicitly predicated on negotiation and collaboration, what social 
constructionists might call co-creation. In such examples one sees how constructing a 
formula can be fluid, messy, subjective and passionate yet those involved are still 
admirably engaged in the task of trying to build a structure, a reasonably clear way to go 
forward. In TV documentary interviews with participants about the negotiations involved 
in constructing the Good Friday Agreement, there seemed to be evidence of not just a 
chemistry but almost an alchemy at work in the process; a combination of grit, grace and 
reason to formulate a coherent and workable process in the boiling mixture of Northern 
Irish politics. 
 
 
Reformulating formulation 
 
We feel that the formulations we, in clinical psychology, develop, are closer to this other 
kind of ‘chemistry’. Rather than our work being an objective or semi-objective formulation 
of a problem ‘out there’, instead we could see ourselves as engaged in a process of 
ongoing collaborative sense making.  In this context we would see ‘formulations’ partly 
as stories for therapists (clients generally don’t come to see us asking for formulations) 
which help orient us in some way to the client, and partly as a description of the 
collaborative process itself.  Formulations, then, are situated in particular contexts and 
oriented to particular purposes; they are perspectives.  If clinical work is seen as a series 
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of dialogues or conversations then a practitioner’s formulation is one person’s account of 
that conversation.  
 
This definition may seem unnecessarily vague but it is our best attempt since it needs to 
cover a range of approaches from the more conventional conceptualization of 
biographical and historical causes of problems to non-causal and non-pathological 
understandings.  This flexibility is important since clients come to us requesting different 
things (Street et. al., 1991).  Many times an implicit wish is for a coherent understanding 
leading to some kind of resolution but our response to this will be influenced both by our 
clients (who will be influenced by background, culturally available discourses like popular 
psychology and so on), our own theoretical orientations and our service contexts.  This 
does not mean that we do not ever draw on theories – good theories are, after all, often 
very good stories – rather it is about emphasizing that those theories are servants of a 
larger engagement in collaborative ‘sense making’ rather than masters of a scientific eye 
whose gaze assumes a questionable objectivity over a person’s experience (Moss 
2002). 
 
In systemic terms we are suggesting that a formulation is a map rather than the territory 
and so it is its usefulness rather than some notion of value-free accuracy which is most 
important (Carr, 2000; Johnstone, 2002).  We would see formulations as ‘thick’ and rich 
descriptions rather than the superficial ‘thin’ descriptions which diagnosis offers. 
 
Collaborative work, then, becomes not us fitting the client into our model (Johnstone, 
2002) and selling it to them, but us sharing our expertise of various kinds and learning 
from clients’ expertise on themselves and their experience.  This entails our being more 
transparent and reflexive about our knowledge, experience and ideas – our view is a 
view from somewhere (a particular time, place and person).  The material which forms 
the basis for these shared constructions with clients comes from a rich storehouse that 
may include the kind of professional knowledge found in journal articles but may also 
include our own lives, fiction and film (Newnes, 2001).  Such transparency, what some 
have called a ‘not knowing’ approach (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988), means that we 
need to be open about the commitments which can lead us to favour some ideas more 
than others.  It also means that we need to be open to challenge by clients, for us to be 
aware of our blind spots and attempt to make these more visible to ourselves and our 
clients.  
 
What makes a ‘good’ formulation?   
 
Obviously criteria will depend on the aim of the formulation.  Beyond the fairly obvious 
notion that a formulation should help the client and therapist make sense of the client’s 
difficulties in the context of their lives and lay out key issues to be addressed, however, 
we feel that criteria developed for assessing the quality of qualitative research can be of 
help here.  Yardley (2000) has argued that good research should: have a sensitivity to 
context (theoretical, empirical, social etc); show commitment and rigour (e.g. an in-depth 
engagement with the topic and a breadth and depth of analysis); be transparent and 
coherent (eg use transparent methods, show clarity and reflexivity); and have impact 
and importance (though this latter criterion is more applicable to research).  
 
We might also add that marks of a good formulation might include: that it is explicit and 
understandable by the client; is based on the evidence of what the client has said (but 
makes a distinction between what the client has said and the practitioner’s interpretation 
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of it); incorporates the client’s own account, and places the client’s concerns in a social 
context (e.g. Hagan & Smail, 1997a, 1997b).  
 
Our spoken or written formulations could also allow more space for image and metaphor 
and there should be a greater attention to formulation as poesis (Mair, 1989) an 
approach that sees all language as metaphorical. Thus all of a formulation could be said 
to be metaphorical. Again this approach to language would be a different kind of 
chemistry, closer again to a kind of alchemy (Jung, 1967).  This need not mean we are 
advocating an abandoning of co-creation to some kind of wholly unreasoned magic, or 
what David Smail (2002) rightly criticises as naïve Social Constructionism where we can 
simply co-create any reality we want to and where ‘anything goes’. When we give up a 
commitment to the kind of naïve realism which leads to an expert model of therapy, we 
don’t at the same time give up our expertise or our sense of having deeply held ideas 
and values.  Rather, we simply give up the illusion that we can have either a ‘view from 
nowhere’ or a ‘God’s eye-view’ of our clients’ difficulties.  The Bunsen burner is under us 
both. 
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